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Abstract
We define a class of pure exchange Edgeworth trading processes that under minimal as-
sumptions converge to a stable set in the space of allocations, and characterise the Pareto
set of these processes. Choosing a specific process belonging to this class, that we define fair
trading, we analyse the trade dynamics between agents located on a weighted network. We
determine the conditions under which there always exists a one-to-one map between the set
of networks and the set of stable equilibria. This result is used to understand what is the
effect of the network topology on the trade dynamics and on the final allocation. We find
that the positions in the network affect the distribution of the utility gains, given the initial
allocations.
Keywords: out of equilibrium dynamics, exchange economy, Pareto processes, networks,
centrality
JEL classification: D5, D51, D52, D85
The main contribution of this paper is to fill a gap in the literature on trade, providing a
dynamical model of trade on a network. There are many reasons why we want to consider the
network structure of the agents, starting with the fact that real trades are shaped and influ-
enced by the structure of relationships between agents: not everybody interacts with everybody
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else due to geography, social ties, technological compatibility. Quoting [12]: “disequilibrium
considerations have something to do with the institutional structure of transactions and the
way in which markets are organized”. We are interested in modeling an economy where the
individual market power matters, and where we let market power depend on the position in the
network. The local nature of many markets and their dependence on the global structure is
another characteristics of real markets that can be analysed within a network formulation, and
there are many interesting questions that can be analysed in this context, that are subject of a
very active area of research in economics. For an exhaustive review of these contributions see
[27]. Our paper differs from the works reviewed in [27] as we do not explicitly model strategic
interactions among agents, but despite this simplification we are able to characterise the dy-
namics of trade on a network with a tractable convergent dynamical systems, providing a novel
contribution to the literature. Inside the provided framework we prove a version of the Second
Welfare Theorem for networks, contributing to the analysis of the effect of the network structure
on final allocations and the distribution of welfare.
0.1 Relation with the literature
One of the major subjects of interest in economics is the analysis of prices and allocations in
markets, whose importance has been clear since the first attempts to produce rigorous math-
ematical modeling of the functioning of a market. Nonetheless the most diffused approach in
mathematical economics, namely general equilibrium theory, relies on the fundamental assump-
tion that individuals have no market power, hence take prices as given, de facto ruling out any
significative analysis of prices. In the Walrasian competitive equilibrium all trading in decentral-
ized exchange takes place at the final equilibirum prices, while in the real world agents discover
equilibrium prices only by making mutually advantageous transaction at disequilibrium prices
[13]. Most of the equilibrium models are hence lacking a proper out-of-equilibrium analysis,
where the assumption of perfect competition prevents agents from actually changing prices. In
order to circumvent the impasse given by the impossibility of a real price dynamics, the ficti-
tious figure of the “auctioneer” had to be introduced. Models with the auctioneer are usually
called taˆtonnement models, which suffer from important lack of realism: agents constantly re-
contract instead of trading and so only prices are changing out of equilibrium while quantities
are fixed [12]. Moreover [2] provides another argument for the implausibility of the Walrasian
auctioneer based on computational complexity, showing that there exist decentralized exchange
processes which show less complexity than the Walrasian process and still reach Pareto effi-
cient allocations, hence these market mechanisms can be considered to be favoured by evolution
and so more plausible than the Walrasian one. Despite the diffusion of equilibrium models,
economists have been aware of their limitations since many years, for a recent critical review see
[32]. Several alternatives have been proposed: in the early sixties there has been an important
effort in modeling out-of-equilibrium dynamics (even if in a simple and still non realistic way)
while still guaranteeing existence and stability of the equilibrium. These models are called non-
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taˆtonnement processes, or trading processes. [40] and [16] introduced the so called “Edegworth
process”, where they gave an explicit treatment of out-of-equilibrium trade. Allowing both
prices and quantities to adjust out of equilibrium a fundamental difference emerges with respect
to previous Walrasian models: equilibrium is path-dependent, and out of equilibrium dynamics
change the equilibrium set, while in a Walrasian process equilibrium is determined solely by the
initial holdings, independently of the path of the process. Edgeworth processes rest on one fun-
damental, reasonable assumption: trade takes place if and only if there is an increase in utility
by trading. [16] assumes that agents need non-zero endowments of each good, and that they
trade only if there is at least one individual who gains and no individual who loses. Under the
assumption of strictly concave utility function Hahn proves that the pure exchange mechanism is
approaching in the limit a Pareto optimum. [40] formulates a more general Edgeworth’s barter
process, where individual transacts at each stage under the restriction that total quantities of
each good stay constant in the economy and a transaction happens if and only if at least one
part becomes better off. Uzawa proves that this process always converges to a Pareto-Optimum.
[12], while recognizing that the Edgeworth process is able to capture price adjustment, even
if to a limited extent, raises two main critiques regarding the assumption of utility-increasing
trades at each step. First, as all parties need to gain something in order to have trade, it can be
the case that only very big coalition can have mutually advantageous trade, hence the presence
of coalition formation costs may prevent trade from actually happening. The second critique
regards the impossibility of Pareto-increasing trades of taking account of the behaviour of arbi-
traging agents who try to take advantage from the opportunities arising in disequilibrium. The
first critique was addressed by [26], who proves that there is always an Edgeworth exchange for
some pair of agents if there is an Edgeworth exchange at all. The second critique is potentially
more cogent, and it is necessary to be more cautious, still it appears there would be nothing to
prevent from considering expectations of future gains as part of the utility function, hence al-
lowing for Pareto-improving speculative trade as well. [11] develops a more sophisticated model
without auctioneer, where money is assumed to be just a medium of exchange, and agents have
two roles at the same time: they act as “dealers” in one commodity, setting its price and then
waiting for others to come and make exchanges. For the remaining commodities agents are
then customers, who search among the dealers to find those with better prices. The dealers
propose their price, and eventually adjust the price after the search. The dealers in choosing
their own price think as if they are in equilibrium, so there is a question if this is actually
modeling price adjustment out of equilibrium. Other relevant works in this literature are by
[20, 21], who construct an iterative decentralized process in environments free of externalities.
It is a stochastic model, where every trade leading to a Pareto superior allocation has a positive
probability of being picked, whilst the individual particular trades are of measure zero if the
set of trades is continuous. Participants pick a trade, according to a probability distribution,
among those not inferior to their current endowment. Their set of feasible trade is then given by
this probabilistically selected bid and the intersection between all the other trades which are not
inferior to her current endowment and a cube centered on the bid. Compatible bids, so potential
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trades, are the points in the interesection of two participants’ such cubes. Here randomization
plays a role, as the referees chooses a random point in this intersection. This process converges
stochastically to a Pareto Optimum and it is usually more stable than taˆtonnement processes.
Notice that this bidding process has some of the characteristics of non-taˆtonnement processes,
as trade is utility increasing and actually takes places during the process. At the same time
trade happens only when demand and supply are in balance thanks to the intervention of a
fictious referee, which resembles the Walrasian auctioneer. Among other stochastic models it
is also worth mentioning [15], who studies out-of-equilibrium price and quantity dynamics in a
decentralized market economy with production modeled as an ergodic Markov process. Agents
start with randomly assigned private prices that are updated through learning and imitation,
quickly converging to quasi-public prices, that is a set of private prices with very low standard
error across different agents, that in the long run converge to public prices.
If the assumption of agents having no market power is removed, then it is necessary to model
how agents agree on the division of the gains from their transaction, and hence how prices
emerge. The two main approaches to the theory of bargaining, namely the non-cooperative
and the cooperative approach, originate from the same person: John Nash. [29], in the paper
that inspired the cooperative game theory approach, proposed a theory of axiomatic bargaining
having a unique solution for the situation in which two agents have access to a set of alternatives
on which they have different preferences. If they are not able to agree on any of the alternatives
they will receive what is the established disagreement point in the feasible set.1 The second
paper [30] originated an important number of successive contributions aimed at establishing non-
cooperative foundations of competititive equilibrium ([34], [35], [14] and [36], just to mention
few of the many relevant works). As [39] points out, while the (cooperative) Nash solution has
possibly been the most successful, other two solution concepts have received also considerable
attention by economists: the egalitarian solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. [22]
propose, once each individual utility has been assigned a weight, to select the maximal point
in the feasible set where utility gains from the disagreement point are proportional to these
weights. The egalitarian solution is a particular case of this, where the weights are equal. The
solution proposed by [23] chooses the maximal point of the feasible set which is proportional
to the profile of maximal payoffs that agents can separately reach among the feasible points
that dominate the disagreement point. This can be intended as a normalised version of the
egalitarian solution [39]. Both solutions satisfy weak Pareto-optimality.
This paper is related to the cited literature as we model out of equilibrium dynamics, with
quantity and prices adjustement using a version of the Edgeworth barter process. We define a
class of trading processes that under a limited number of assumptions converge to equilibrium.
Prices are the instantaneous rate of exchange between goods, and they can change at any
moment along the process, as one would expect in out of equilibrium dynamics. Also, there is
1[19] has studied how communication constrains affect trading outcomes. However his approach is different
from the network approach that we use.
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no gravitation towards equilibrium prices because equilibria are path-dependent. In the family
of the trading processes that satisfy our assumption we restrict attention to a very specific form
of trade, and we adopt the egalitarian solution as the rule according to which agents share utility
gains when they trade. There are evidences in many real word bargaining practices where the
agents divide the “fixed pie” equally, in particular in the practice of sharecropping where, despite
the parties involved very often have different bargaining power, nonetheless the fifty-fifty rule is
dominant in many social groups. [42] gives an evolutionary foundation of such a rule in a contest
without common knowledge and without learning, where agents choices are based only on the
precedent choices of other agents. The process is characterised by a positive feedback that can
eventually reach stability on a fixed division rule. [43], studying a process of convention formation
with adaptive learning, shows that under convexity of the bargaining set the process selects the
Kalai-Smorodisky solution, while [6], by introducing intentional idiosyncratic play find that
the stochastically stable convention is the Nash bargaining instead of the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution.
The choice of a specific trading rule in the context of this paper is without loss of generality, as
our results are true under more general assumptions, as it will be clear in the rest of the paper.
Our paper is very close to [9] and [24], who model knowledge diffusion as a barter process in
which agents exchange different types of knowledge. Agents meet their neighbours repeatedly
and in case there is room for trade, that is there is a differential in two dimensions of knowledge,
they trade, each receiving a constant share of the knowledge differential. At the end of the trade
both parties have an increased utility, as utility increases with knowledge levels. They show that
diffusion of knowledge is maximized where the proportion of links between an agent and other
agents not in her neighbourhood is between 1 and 10 percent of all direct links between agent
pairs.
[5] studies a Walrasian process with bounded infinitesimal selling power for each agent, proving
that all individually rational Pareto optima can be reached if the utility functions are strictly
quasiconcave, continuously differentiable and with positive gradient, provided the individual
selling powers are well chosen. Interestingly he shows that when there are more than two agents
simultaneously trading, so that every agent has positive selling power, it is not possible to reach
an equilibrium where only one consumer is better off. In our model we do not allow for agents
to be out of the market as we only constrain with whom agents can trade, but every agent will
trade as the network is connected, hence our process is non-neutral, as proven by [5].
In this paper we study trade on a specific class of weighted, undirected, connected graphs that
can be seen as a linear combination of stars, where the minimally connected network is a star
and the maximally connected network is a complete one. This class of networks is a weighted
analogous to nested split graphs [25], that are graphs with a nested neighbourhood structure,
where the set of neighbours of lower degree nodes is contained in the set of neighbours of higher
degree ones. Except for the limiting case of the complete graph, the nodes in our networks can
be divided in two partitions according to their degree: nodes in the core are connected between
each other and with all the nodes in the periphery, while nodes in the periphery are connected
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only to nodes in the core, giving a multi-hub network. Nestdness is a relevant characteristic, as it
is typically shown in real world networks, as import-export networks and arms trade networks.
The paper is structured as follows: in the first section we define our family of bilateral trading
processes, and we provide a characterization of the Pareto set to which these processes converge.
In the second section we expose the trading rule of choice, namely the egalitarian rule, proving
that the trade so defined belongs to the family of trades of our interest. In the third section we
extend trading to more agents, and we introduce the network structure as a weighted network.
In section four we prove our version of the Second Welfare Theorem for networks, while in the
last section and in Appendix A, we provide a numerical example, analysing the Cobb-Douglas
case for three agents. We construct the set of equilibria and we show through some examples
the effect of the network topology and the initial distribution of resources on the final allocation.
1 The model
1.1 Pure exchange
There are n ≥ 2 agents, we will generally refer to an agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ≡ N , and m ≥ 2 goods,
and to a good k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} ≡M . Agents can only have non-negative quantities of each good,
and we are considering a pure exchange economy with no production, so that total resources in
the economy are fixed and given by the sum of the agents’ endowments. The endowment of agent
i is a point in the positive orthant of Rm, call this space P = Rm+ , where the k−th coordinate
represents the quantity of good k. Assume time is continuous and goods are infinitely divisible,
and let xik,t be the endowment of agent i at time t for good k. In this way ~xi,t ∈ Rm is the
m–dimensional vector of agent i’s endowment at time t, while ~xk,t ∈ Rn is the n–dimensional
vector of all agents’ endowments of good k at time t. As we assumed there is no production,
nor can the goods be disposed of, the sum of the elements of each such vector ~xk,t is constant
in time. The initial allocations of the economy are then represented by the n vectors of agents’
endowment at time zero, call them {~x1,0, . . . , ~xn,0}. All agents’ allocations at a given point in
time can then be represented by an (m× n) matrix with all non-negative entries, call it Xt. In
the following we may not express the time variable t, when it does not create ambiguity. An
unrestricted state of the economy at any time t is a point in the positive orthant of an Rmn space,
given by the Cartesian product Pn . As we assumed that resources are fixed in the economy at
a point w ∈ Rm (where the k-th coordinate is the total quantity of good k in the economy), the
state space of our interest is a subset of Pn, call it W = {x ∈ Pn : ∑xi = w}, which is an open
subset of an affine subspace with compact closure in (Rm)n [38].
Any agent i is characterised by a differentiable, strictly increasing utility function Ui from Rm
to R. It is also assumed that preferences are strictly convex. Given xt ∈W , a point in the space
of the economy at some point in time t, call ~U(xt) its corresponding n–dimensional vector of
utilities. We call µik,t ≡ ∂Ui(~xi,t)/∂k the marginal utility of agent i, with endowment ~xi,t, with
respect to good k. Define as ~µi,t the gradient of the utility function for agent i at time t, that
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is the vector of all her marginal utilities. All individual gradients are represented by an m × n
matrix of all the marginal utilites at a given point in time, call it Mt. The vector of strictly
positive marginal utilities ~µi,t, is proportional to any vector of marginal rates of substitutions
with respect to any good ` ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
To give the geometrical intuition of the space of the economy, notice that it is the surface of
an (m)-dimensional convex polytope with 2m vertices (i.e. an hyperrectangle) or alternatively a
point on one of its (m−1)-dimensional facets. We can also define a geometrical multidimensional
version of the Edgeworth box. Consider that given the total quantity of good k, call it k¯, every
possible allocations of this among the n agents is a point in the convex hull Γ = {θ1k¯ + · · · +
θnk¯|θi ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
∑
i θi = 1}, that is a point in the (n − 1) regular simplex with edge
lenght k¯. The same holds for each of the m goods (with possibly different k¯ of course). Notice
that the traditional Edgeworth box is nothing but the Cartesian product of two 1-simplices
(that is to say of two segments of a line). Recall that a Cartesian product of simplices is called
a simplotope, and denote as ∆n an n-dimensional simplex,
Definition 1. The multi-dimensional equivalent of the Edgeworth Box for a pure exchange
economy with n agents and m goods is a simplotope Λ =
∏m
j=1 ∆
(n−1)
i , where ∆
(n−1)
j is the
(n − 1) regular simplex with edge of length equal the total quantity of good j. The Edgeworth
Box is of dimension (n− 1)m.
In the pure exchange economy defined above, the contract curve is given by the set of all those
allocation where all marginal utilities are proportional, i.e.
W = {X : ∀ i, j ∈ N, ∃k ∈ R, k 6= 0, s.t. µi(~xi) = kµj(~xj)} . (1)
Proposition 1 ([38]). If preferences are convex and monotonic then the set of Pareto Optima
is homoeomorphic to a closed (n− 1) simplex.
For a proof of Proposition 1 see [38]. Remember that a diffeomorphism implies an homeo-
morphism but not viceversa. The assumptions in Proposition 1 are standard in economics, and
are indeed minimal: no assumption on the commodity space, very few restriction on the utility.
In order to obtain a diffeomorphism it is enough to assume convexity of the function and of the
commodity space. It has been shown that if preferences are C2 and convex it is possible to find
utility representations that admit a convex space, for an exhaustive discussion and proofs see
[28]. Notice that in our case the assumptions of the proposition are satisfied: the state space
of interest is an open subset of an affine subspace with compact closure in Rmn [38]. Moreover,
we also assumed preferences to be convex, so the indifference curves are convex. The convexity
assumption makes the problem much easier to deal with, but in case this assumption is relaxed
we can still characterise the Pareto Set, that will be an (n− 1) stratified set, that is a manifold
with borders and corners, see [41], [10]. Note finally that add an error term to Equation (1),
then we get a diffusion process similar to the one analyzed by [1], generalized to networks by [3]
and, outside economics, by [33].
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1.2 Trading
Define trading between agents in N as a continuous dynamic over the endowments, which is
based on marginal utilities. Formally it will be a set of differential equations of the form:
d~xi,t
dt
= fi (Mt) , (2)
where function fi from Rn×m to Rm, satisfies the following 3 properties, for any set Mt =
(~µ1,t, ~µ2,t, . . . ~µn,t) of feasible marginal utilities:
• Zero sum: the sum
∑n
i=1
~fi is equal to the null vector ~0.
• Trade: if there are at least two vectors of marginal utilities, ~µi,t and ~µj,t, which are linearly
independent, then at least one between ~fi and ~fj is different from ~0.
• Positive gradient: for any agent i it will always be the case that ~µi,t · ~fi ≥ 0, with strictly
positive sign if there is trade.
The assumption of zero sum trade guarantees that we are in a pure exchange economy without
consumption nor production of new goods, as the amount of all the goods remain unchanged
at any step of the process. The assumption of trade guarantees that there is actually exchange,
unless we are in a Pareto optimal allocation, where the marginal rate of substitution between
any two goods would be the same for any couple of agents. Finally, the assumption of positive
gradient guarantees that any marginal exchange represents a Pareto improvement for any agent
i ∈ N . That is because
dUi
dt
=
m∑
k=1
dUi
dxik
dxik
dt
= ~µi,t · fi (Mt) ≥ 0
(3)
Generalizing [17], it is easy to show that all and only the fixed points of the dynamical system
defined in Equation (2), are Pareto optimal allocations. That is because the function
U¯ (Xt) ≡
n∑
i=1
Ui(~xi,t)
can be seen as a potential. It is bounded in its dominion of all possible allocations, it strictly
increases as long as there is trade (i.e. out of equilibrium), and it is stable when there are no two
agents who could both profitably exchange goods between them. At the limit U¯ will converge for
sure to a value, say U¯∗, corresponding to an allocation X∗. As preferences are strictly convex,
there will be no trade in X∗.
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The fixed points of the above dynamical system are reached by a sequence of infinitesimally
small trades from an initial state, hence the set of the solutions of the trade mechanism, call it
the Stable Pareto Set, is an open subset of the Pareto Set defined above [38]
Note that at this stage there is no assumptions restricting endowments not to become negative,
that is to say we are not requiring a condition like dxikdt > 0 as xik → 0. This will depend on
the initial endowment Xt of the agents and or their utility functions. As any marginal exchange
represents a Pareto improvement for any agent i ∈ N , we will implicitely assume that any
Pareto improvement starting from the initial conditions will lie in the region of non–negative
endowments. Examples that satisfy these properties are the classical Walrasian taˆtonnement
process, as well as non-taˆtonnement processes, as can be find in [17] and [20, 21].
2 Fair trading between two agents
Let us start by considering n = 2. There is an entire family of trading mechanisms satisfying
the very general assumptions of zero sum, trade and positive gradient. As we choose a trading
mechanism we are implicitly making assumptions on some bargaining rule that has been fixed
by the agents participating in the trade. This is a restriction to some extent, still we can choose
different trading mechanisms corresponding to different bargaining solutions that satisfy the
assumptions. We define a mechanism that we call fair trading, that is based on the egalitarian
solution by [22]: whenever there is room for a Pareto improvement, agents trade if and only if
they equally split the gains in utility from the trade.
Trading is bilateral, N = {1, 2}, and m ≥ 2 goods. By the zero sum property we have that
~f1 = −~f2. We are restricting our attention to the case where marginal utility from trading is
equally split among the two agents. The Pareto improvement from trading is defined in Equation
(3), so we are requiring that:
~µ1,t · f1 (~µ1,t, ~µ2,t) = ~µ2,t · f2 (~µ1,t, ~µ2,t) .
By the zero sum property this is satisfied if
(~µ1,t + ~µ2,t) · f1 (~µ1,t, ~µ2,t) = 0 ,
which simply means that marginal trade has to be orthogonal to the sum of marginal utilities.
There is a full sub–space of dimension m− 1 that is orthogonal to the sum of the two marginal
utilities. Here we consider a single element that lies in the sub–plane generated by ~µ1,t and ~µ2,t.
We assume that trade for agent 1, ~f1, is the orthogonal part of ~µ1,t with respect to ~µ1,t + ~µ2,t
(or the vector rejection of ~µ1,t from ~µ1,t + ~µ2,t). In formulas it is
f1 (~µ1,t, ~µ2,t) = ~µ1,t − ~µ1,t · (~µ1,t + ~µ2,t)|~µ1,t + ~µ2,t|2 (~µ1,t + ~µ2,t) (4)
where | · | is the Euclidean norm in Rm.
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Proposition 2. In a fair trading between two agents, the instantaneous trade of one agent is
equal to the additive inverse of the instantaneous trade of the other agent.
Proof. We have that:
f2 (~µ1,t, ~µ2,t) = ~µ2,t − ~µ2,t · (~µ1,t + ~µ2,t)|~µ1,t + ~µ2,t|2 (~µ1,t + ~µ2,t) = −f1 (~µ1,t, ~µ2,t)
because
f1 (~µ1,t, ~µ2,t) + f2 (~µ1,t, ~µ2,t) = (~µ1,t + ~µ2,t)− |~µ1,t + ~µ2,t|
2
|~µ1,t + ~µ2,t|2 (~µ1,t + ~µ2,t) =
~0 .
Proposition 3. The fair trading mechanism between two agents defined in Equation (4) satisfies
zero sum, trade and positive gradient.
Proof. It is easy to check that the fair trading specified in (4) satisfies the trade condition, as it
is equal to ~0 only if ~µ1,t = k~µ2,t, for some k ∈ R.
To see that it also satisfies positive gradient, note that a sufficient condition for having a non-
negative change in marginal utility:
~µ1,t ·
(
~µ1,t − ~µ1,t · (~µ1,t + ~µ2,t)|~µ1,t + ~µ2,t|2 (~µ1,t + ~µ2,t)
)
≥ 0
is that ‖~µ1,t · (~µ1,t + ~µ2,t) ‖ ≤ |~µ1,t||~µ1,t + ~µ2,t|, where ‖ · ‖ is the classical norm in R. But last
inequality is the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, which is always strict, being 0 if and only if ~µ1,t
and ~µ2,t are linearly dependent, that is when there is no trade.
Note here that any αf1 (~µ1,t, ~µ2,t), with α > 0 would go, but we stick to the normalised case
with α = 1. In general, this parameter α will represent the speed at which the dynamical system
is moving, so there will be no loss in generality in assuming it equal to 1.
So, the fair trading mechanism is a bilateral pure exchange mechanism satisfying the required
three assumptions. The two agents trade over m ≥ 2 goods, starting from some initial allocation
X0 ∈ Rm×2 and evolving according to the following system of differential equations in matrix
form, based on Equations (2) and (4):
dXt
dt
=
(
~µ1,t − ~µ1,t · (~µ1,t + ~µ2,t)|~µ1,t + ~µ2,t|2 (~µ1,t + ~µ2,t) , ~µ2,t −
~µ2,t · (~µ1,t + ~µ2,t)
|~µ1,t + ~µ2,t|2 (~µ1,t + ~µ2,t)
)
. (5)
This dynamical system is well defined, as ~µ1,t and ~µ1,t are defined in Xt, and are based on the
utilities U1 and U2. However, this system is not linear in Mt.
Theorem 1. [Cauchy-Lipschitz] If fi is uniformly Lipschitz continuous for all i and continuous
in t then the dynamical system has a unique solution given initial conditions.
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Proof. Any textbook, see for example [31].
If the dynamical system has a unique solution, then it is invertible. This means that we can go
back to initial conditions
To have a graphical intuition for our approach, consider Figure 1, where we have m = 2. In
the left panel we represent allocations of the two goods, while in the right panel we represent
utilities of the two agents. The red and the blue lines (in both panels) are the boundaries of the
Pareto improving allocations. The yellow curve is the Walrasian path: it is a straight line in the
left panel, but not necessarily in the right panel. The green line is the path obtained with fair
trading: it is a straight line with 45◦ inclination in the right panel.
3 More agents
Suppose now that there are more than two agents, so that n ≥ 3. Trade is always bilateral, and
fair trading implies that for every trade the marginal utility from trading has to be equally split
among the parts:
(~µi,t + ~µj,t) · fi (~µi,t, ~µj,t) = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j (6)
This must hold for all of the n− 1 possible couples where trader i is involved, so that individual
i’s instantaneous trade ~fi lies in a sub–space of dimension m − n + 1, if it exists. This clearly
imposes a first constraint on the minimal possible amount m of goods.
Moreover, by the zero sum property, we need that the sum of all the istantaneous trades cancels
out,
∑ ~fi = 0. This is an additional constraint, that will be satisfied only if the dimension of
the sub–space where ~fi lies is more than one. So the minimum number of goods that guarantees
the existence of fair trading is such that m− n+ 1 ≥ 2, or that m ≥ n+ 1.
Proposition 4. If n ≥ 3 then fair trading mechanism exists if and only if m ≥ n+ 1
Example 1 (3 traders). Suppose that for a certain allocation all the three vectors of marginal
utilities of the traders are linearly independent. Say ~µ1 = (2, 1, 1), ~µ2 = (1, 2, 1) and ~µ3 =
(1, 1, 2). ~f1 has to be orthogonal to both ~µ1 + ~µ2 = (3, 3, 2) and ~µ1 + ~µ3 = (3, 2, 3), so that it
will be of the form ~f1 = k(5,−3,−3), for some k ∈ R. Similarly we will have ~f2 = h(−3, 5,−3),
for some h ∈ R, and ~f3 = `(−3,−3, 5), for some ` ∈ R.
To balance trading we need also that ~f1+ ~f2+ ~f3 = (0, 0, 0), but as they are linearly independent
vectors, this is possible only for k = h = ` = 0, which means no trading, even if marginal utilities
are not proportional. 
Remark 1. If the fair trading is between two traders (n = 2) then two goods (m ≥ 2) are
sufficient to guarantee the existence of trade
The above can be easily verified, with two traders each trade ~f1 and ~f2 by construction is
orthogonal to the same vector ~f1 + ~f2, so that they will never be linearly independent.
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The previous example shows that if m ≤ n, and m ≥ 3, then fair trading is not possible. If
the number of goods where instead m = n + 1, then every candidate ~fi would lie on a plane,
and there would always exist a non–trivial solution for the zero sum property because we would
have a homogeneous system of linear equations with n linear equations in n+ 1 variables. If m
is even greater, then existence would result a fortiori.
3.1 The network environment
What happens if m ≤ n+1, if for instance there are only 2 goods and many agents? In this case
we consider a market mechanism based on a network that allows for distinct couples to match
and trade with some exogenously fixed probability in every instant of time. When they meet
they will trade according to the unique fair trading mechanism defined in Section 2.
What we define as network is an exogenously fixed vector ~p of probabilities among the n agents.
At every instant in continuous time agent i is picked with probability pi, and then i will trade
with another of the n − 1 nodes with uniform probability. In this way the couple of agents i
and j may be matched to trade with probability
pi+pj
n−1 . This is equivalent to say that agents are
node of a weighted network, where the weight of edge (i, j) is wij =
pi+pj
n−1 . The above defined
matching mechanism generates a family of connected weighted networks on N nodes, that can
be thought as a linear combination of stars (analogously to nested split graphs in [25]). The case
with the lowest number of connection is when the probability vector has only one entry equal
to one: one of the agents is picked with probability 1 and interact with any other with uniform
probability, so that she is the centre of a star where each edge has weight 1/(n− 1). If instead
in the vector ~p there is more than one entry which is non-zero the corresponding network is a
multi–hub network with a number of nodes in the core equal to the number of non-zero entries in
~p. If all the entries in ~p are non-zero then the resulting network is a complete weighted network.
As randomness is confined to instantaneous moments in continuous time, we can express
them just as weights by which the different matchings are considered. We can apply Equation
(4), that we will call ~f ′, and Equation (5), to have a dynamical system of the form2
dXt
dt
=
(∑
i∈N
p1 + pi
n− 1 f
′
1 (~µ1,t, ~µi,t) ,
∑
i∈N
p2 + pi
n− 1 f
′
2 (~µ2,t, ~µi,t) , . . . ,
∑
i∈N
pn + pi
n− 1 f
′
n (~µn,t, ~µi,t)
)
. (7)
As for the case of Equation (5), this system is not linear. ~fi is a linear combination of all the
pairwise f ′is, based on the probabilities.
Proposition 5. The fair trading mechanism on a network satisfies zero sum, trade and positive
gradient properties.
2Here we consistently define that f ′i (~µi,t, ~µi,t) = ~0.
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Proof. Zero sum holds as for every couple i and j, which is matched with weight
pi+pj
n−1 , fi = −fj
by construction, as discussed in Section 2. Trade holds because, for every couple i and j such
that ~µi and ~µj are linearly independent, we can consider trader k such that pk > 0. i and j
will trade with k with positive probability, and if ~µi and ~µj are linearly independent, then at
least one of them is linearly independent with ~µk, suppose it is j. From fair trading between
two agents, as discussed in Section 2, we have that the marginal utility of that trader from
that matching is strictly increasing. Then, as no other trading can generate negative marginal
utilities, it means that the overall marginal utility of that trader from all matchings is strictly
increasing. And this can happen only if there is trade, i.e.
~fj =
∑
i∈N
pj + pi
n− 1 f
′
j (~µj,t, ~µi,t) 6= ~0 .
Finally, positive gradient comes from the fact that ~fi is a linear combination of f
′
is, so that
~µi,t · ~fi =
∑
j∈N
pi + pj
n− 1 ~µi,t · f
′
j (~µi,t, ~µj,t) ,
which is strictly positive as soon as there is trading.
Notice that, as for each bilateral trade agents equally share the gain in marginal utility, in the
simplest case of a star the agent in the core gets half of the total gain in marginal utility across
all trades.
4 A second welfare theorem for networks
In this section we will prove that there is a one to one mapping between the simplex of proba-
bilities and the Pareto Set obtained as a result of the fair trade dynamics. Also, we will prove
that this map has no holes (is simply connected) and so we can provide a version of the second
welfare theorem for networks.
Define as W the set of stationary point of a dynamics based on marginal utilities, that is the
subset of the Pareto Set that is reached by the trade dynamics defined by ~f .
Theorem 2. If f is continuous in t, x, p and Lipschitz in x with Lipschitz constant independent
of t and p, then the solution x(t, p, x(t0)) is continuous in (t, p, x(t0)) jointly.
Proof. Being x continuous in p,x(t0) and uniformly in t, then the solution x(t, p, x(t0)) is also con-
tinuous in t for given p and x(t0), we can equivalently say that the map (p, x(t0))→ x(t, p, x(t0))
is continuous, so standard arguments imply that x is continuous in t, p, x(t0) jointly.
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Theorem 3. Given a pure exchange economy, with monotonic, continuous, convex preferences,
and trade dynamics defined by a Lipschitz continuous function, if x∗ is a point in the Pareto Set
WN of the stable points of the dynamics, then there exists a weighted network g that, given the
initial allocations, implements a sequence of trades that ends up in x∗.
Proof. Lipschitz continuity guarantees existence and uniqueness of solutions by (1), and unique-
ness implies invertibility. Call x¯(t, p) the solution of the dynamical system defined by f(t, x, p),
with initial conditions x(t0) = x0. If we introduce a new variable s ∈ Rn, and define as
xˆ = [x, s] ∈ Rmn+n and fˆ(t, xˆ) = [f(t, x, p), 0] ∈ Rnm+n, we can now define the initial condition
as xˆ(t0) = [x0, p], which means we are imposing s(t0) = p, but parameters are not changing in
time, so s(t) = p for all t and the solution of the dynamical system defined by fˆ(t, xˆ) with initial
condition xˆ(t0), is xˆ
∗(t, p) = [x¯(t, p), p]. This means we can transform parameters into initial
conditions.
Now define an initial time τ and final time t and assume that both lie in an interval [a, b]. Assume
also that all the solutions xˆ∗(t, p) exist in this interval (we can choose the interval arbitrarily so
that all our solutions exist). Then define a map from a subset U ⊂ Rnm+m into Rnm+m
Stτ = x(t, τ, xˆ(τ))
This map the initial value xˆ(τ) to the solution at time t. By (2) x(t, τ, xˆ(τ)) is continuous in
(t, τ, xˆ(τ)). By uniqueness, it is invertible and its inverse is continuous. So Stτ : U → WN is a
homeomorphism (that is one-to-one, onto, continuous, with continuous inverse).
From this follows our result: for any choice of the initial allocation and of the parameter p
defining the network, there is one solution inWN , and for any such solution there is an allocation
and a network that generated it through the trade dynamics.
The above proofs follow standard arguments in the theory of ordinary differential equations.
For reference, see [8].
Lemma 6. The map from initial allocations and network to the Pareto Set, Stτ : U → WN is
simply connected.
Proof. U is a convex subset of Rn+m as a product of two convex subset of Rn and Rm respectively,
so U is simply connected. Being U and WN homoeomorphic, and given U is simply connected,
this is a necessary and sufficient condition for WN to be simply connected.
Hence we proved that there is a continuous, invertible with continuous inverse map between
the set of initial conditions (initial allocations and network) and that this map has no holes
(it is simply connected). Notice also that, as we did in the proof of Theorem 3, transforming
parameters into initial conditions, we can transform initial conditions into parameters, so that
we can study the effect of the network topology varying the initial allocations.
We are also able to characterise the set of Pareto Optima that are the resulting stable points of
the fair trade dynamics
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Proposition 7. The set of stationary points of a fair trading dynamics on networks, WN is a
subset of the Pareto Set which is homeomorphic to a closed (n− 1) simplex.
Proof. The proof is trivial if we use Theorem 3. WN is a strict subset of W as the stable point
of the trading dynamics are Pareto Optima and all those allocations in W where agents are
worse off than their initial allocation in the dynamics are not in WN . Given that the set W is
homeomorphic to a (n − 1) simplex and that WN is continuous and simply connected, WN is
also homeomorphic to a (n− 1) simplex.
The assumption of Lipschitz continuity is central in our context in order to ensure existence and
uniqueness of the solution. Notice that although sufficient, Lipschitz continuity is not necessary
for the existence of a solution continuous in the initial conditions, see for example [18]. Lipschitz
continuity is a strong form of uniform continuity which puts a condition on the rate of change
of the function, or in other words it puts a bound on its first derivatives. In the case of our
interests then a function may fail to be Lipschitz close to the boundary of the goods space, that
is to say where x is close to zero, where the rate of change of the function f can be very high. We
rule these cases out by properly choosing the utility function, even if the failure of the Lispchitz
assumption would not necessarily invalidate our results where there still exist a unique solution
to the trade dynamics.
It is worth considering an alternative proof of the homeomorphism result in Proposition 7,
which provides a more intuitive understanding. This argument also clarifies why we focus on
our particular definition of networks, whose space has the same dimension of WN , and on fair
trading. Suppose that we have at least three agents, i, j and k, and that we start from three
different star networks: one with pi = 1, one with pj = 1, and one with pk = 1. Unless we
start from an allocation that is already Pareto optimal, the three points that we would reach
adopting these three networks, and starting from the same initial allocation, cannot coincide.
That is because in a star network, since agents use the fair trading rule, in the limiting point
lying on WN the central agent will obtain a marginal utility that is equal to the sum of the
marginal utilities of all the other agents. So, it is impossible that we reach a unique allocation
in which half of the overall marginal utilities is given at the same time to each one of the three
agents i, j and k. Figure 2 provides a graphical intuition of this argument in the projection of
the space of marginal utilities with respect to the initial allocation.
5 The network effect
The main implication of our result is that we can evaluate the impact of the network structure
on the final allocation, as there exists a one-to-one map between each network in our family
and the solutions of 7. Unfortunately we are not able to obtain explicit solutions for 7, hence
a proper exercise of comparative statics cannot be performed, but we can still say something
about the effect of the network on individual utilities.
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Proposition 8. Given the initial allocation, any agent strictly prefers to be the core of a star,
that is a point p in the probability simplex is always Pareto dominated by all the points that are
closer to the agent’s vertex.
Proof. Let us consider three agents, and let us focus on agent 1. Assume that for the given
initial allocation, agent 1 prefers trading with agent 2 over agent three at any point in time,
which implies that the utility she could get by only a bilateral trade with agent 2 is higher than
any utility level she can get by trading a fraction of her time with 2 and a fraction of her time
with 3. The change of agent 1 utility in time is given by:
dUi
dt
=
p1 + p2
2
~µ1,tf1,2 +
1− 2p2
2
~µ1,tf1,3 (8)
and we are assuming that f1,2 > f1,3 at every instant in time. This implies that ceteris
paribus, agent 1 gets her maximum utility level when p1 = 1, as
6 A numeric example: the Cobb-Douglas case
In this section we present some numerical examples in the case of three agents trading two goods
for which they have Cobb-Douglas preferences (while some of the details are left to Appendix
A). By constructing the contract curve it will be shown that the stable points of the fair trading
mechanism are diffeomorphic to a n − 1 simplex. We will also construct the one-to-one map
between the simplex of the probabilities and the fair contracts as stated by Theorem 3.
The state space of the trade dynamics in the network case is the Cartesian product between the
(n− 1) unitary simplex (which represents the space of probabilities by which agents are picked)
and the space of commodities, that is ∆n−1 ×W ⊂ Rnm. Our main result is that each point
in the simplex, given an initial point in the commodity space, can be mapped into a solution
which, at a final time, corresponds to a point on the contract curve.
Suppose that the three agents have a Cobb-Douglas utility function (so that convex preferences
are satisfied) with constant return to scale: Ui(x) = x
αi
1 x
1−αi
2 . This implies that the functions
are concave, and that the Pareto Set is a curved (n − 1) simplex, or equivalently that it is
diffeomorphic to a unitary simplex.
Proposition 9. With Cobb-Douglas utility function the set of stable point of a fair trading
dynamics is diffeomorphic to a (n− 1) simplex.
Proof. See [37] for a geometric proof.
Consider Figure 3: the leftmost simplex represents the space of topologies, each point in
that space represents a weighted graph between the agents. Each network is then mapped to
the corresponding equilibrium of the dynamical system defined by the fair trading mechanism,
represented in the space of utilities on the right of the figure. The map between the two spaces
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is visualised through colors, a point on the simplex on the left (network) reaches the equilibrium
level of utility represented by a point of the same color in the space of utilities. The figure on
the right, that is the set of equilibria W3, is a curved 2-simplex, with the vertices of the simplex
of network topologies that are mapped in the vertices of W3.
In the case represented in Figure 3 we set that the utility functions are determined by α1 = 0.5,
α2 = 0.4, α3 = 0.6, while the initial allocations are such that agent three has the highest
endowment of both goods, agent two has the lowest endowment of good 1 and endowment
of good 2 higher than agent 1 that is x3,1 > x1,1 > x2,1 and x3,2 > x2,2 > x1,2. Note that
with 3 agents and 2 goods the Edgeworth Box is a simplotope in 4 dimensions, so we cannot
visualise it. We can represent the contract curve in the space of the agents’ utilities, that is a
three–dimensional space. From the results obtained we know that the set of stable points of
the trading dynamics, WN , is a subset of the contract curve defined in Equation (1), that it is
homeomorphic to a 2-simplex. From Proposition 9, we have that the set of stable equilibria is
not only homeomorphic, but also diffeomorphic, to a 2-simplex.
The numerical examples provide illustration of our theoretical results: the map between the
network topologies and the set of equilibria is continuous, and there is a diffeomorphism between
the simplex of topologies and the set of equilibria: each initial network is continuously mapped
through our dynamical process described in Equation (7) into a point of the curved simplex
representing the set of equilibria. Notice also that the points corresponding to the three vertices
in the probability simplex, that is to say cases in which the probability of being picked is 1 on
one agent and zero on the others, so the cases in which the network is a weighted star with
weights 0.5 on each edge, correspond to points in which the utility gain of the core of the star is
half of the total gain in utility generated by the trade. The actual level of utility in equilibrium
will depend on the initial allocation, but in all the cases will be the highest possible for that
agent given the initial allocation. Equivalently the barycentre of the simplex corresponds to
a complete network (a triangle) with equally weighted edges, hence each agent in equilibrium
receives one third of the gain in utility generated.
The results of the numerical examples introduced in this section are summarised in Table 1,
and described extensively in Appendix A. There is a very clear insight emerging: observe that
the utility gain of an agent depends crucially on her position in the network: it is maximised
when the agent is the core of a weighted star ceteris paribus. This means that utility maximising
agents would also have preferences on the network structure, so it would be interesting to think
of a game where individuals first compete for the position in the network and then trade. Given
that every one would prefer to be the only hub of a star, each agent has not only incentive
in creating the highest number of connections, but also in destroying the highest number of
connections among other agents.
Interesting insights emerge when there is only one rich agent and not much difference between
the two poorer agents, then the disadvantaged agents are better off on networks where they
interact most of the times with the richest agent, over networks where they interact most of the
times among them. When the inequality is extreme and there is a middle income agent and
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Preferences Initial allocations Utility in Equilibrium Fig.
x3,1 > x1,1 > x2,1 x
∗
1 ∈ [2.41, 2.43]
α1 = 0.5, α2 = 0.4, α3 = 0.6 x3,2 > x2,2 > x1,2 x
∗
2 ∈ [2.44, 2.49] B
x∗3 ∈ [3.315, 3.33]
x1,1 > x2,1 > x3,1 x
∗
1 ∈ [3.645, 3.649]
α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.5 x2,2 > x1,2 > x3,2 x
∗
2 ∈ [3.536, 3.54] C
x∗3 ∈ [0.994, 1.02]
x1,1 > x3,1 > x2,1 x
∗
1 ∈ [5.14, 5.18]
α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.5 x1,2 > x2,2 > x3,2 x
∗
2 ∈ [1.38, 1.5] E
x∗3 ∈ [1.52, 1.56]
x1,1 > x3,1 > x2,1 x
∗
1 ∈ [4.905, 4.935]
α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.2 x1,2 > x2,2 > x3,2 x
∗
2 ∈ [1.88, 1.96] F
x∗3 ∈ [1.94, 2.06]
x1,1 > x2,1 > x3,1 x
∗
1 ∈ [3.378, 3.395]
α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.2 x1,2 > x2,2 > x3,2 x
∗
2 ∈ [3.041, 3.065] G
x∗3 ∈ [1.774, 1.784]
Table 1: Summary of results described in Appendix A.
an extremely poor agent, the middle income may extract more utility by interacting with the
extremely poor agent, while she will not prefer to be in networks where she interacts only with
the richest agent because in this case her utility gain will be minimum. On the other hand, the
most disadvantaged agent will prefer to trade more with the richest agent than with the middle
income agent. These results are related to [4], who find a clear relation between the structure
of the network and the meritocracy of the society: in their model when the network is sparse
then individuals’ compensations depends on the position in the network instead of their ability
to produce value. Similar result is obtained in a coalitional setting by [7] who find a connection
between network sparseness and inequality by studying how the extremal Lorenz distribution
changes under different network topologies.
7 Conclusions
This paper studies an Edgeworth process on weighted graphs, where agents can continuously
exchange their endowments with their neighbours, driven by their utility functions. We define
a family of trade dynamics which fixed points coincide with the Pareto Set, and choose a spe-
cific mechanism in this family, according to which individuals equally split the utility gain of
every trade. This choice is without loss of generality as the results obtained hold for all trade
mechanisms that satisfy zero sum, trade and positive gradient. Under usual assumptions on the
structure of preferences we prove a version of the Second Welfare Theorem on networks: for
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any network in the space of weighted connected multi-hub networks, there exists a sequence
of Pareto improving trades which ends in the Pareto Set. Assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences
we build numerical examples of the mapping between the network topology and the final al-
location in the Pareto Set, and provide a brief analysis of the impact of the topology on the
final allocation. We believe that the relationship between the network and inequality should be
further analysed, to understand the link between deprivation in endowments and deprivation in
opportunities determined by the position on the network.
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A Details of the simulations
We have three agents with Cobb-Douglas utility function with constant return to scale: Ui(x) =
xαi1 x
1−αi
2 . Call αi the exponent of the utility function for agent i, and xi(0) = (xi,1, xi,2) the
initial allocation for agent i. The probability space is represented by a unitary 2-simplex, where
the barycentric coordinates of a point represent the probability triple (p1, p2, p3).
Each point in the simplex is associated with a different color: red for the point (1, 0, 0), blue for
(0, 1, 0), green for (0, 0, 1). The probability simplex is represented as a color gradient of blue,
red and green: each point has a different color, and starting from the three vertices they fade
into each other, in a way that the magnitude of the component of blue, red and green in a color
is proportional to the magnitude of the corresponding vertex coordinate. The (barycentric)
coordinates of each point in the simplex represent the probability each agent is picked to trade.
Every such point is mapped to a weighted graph according to the matching mechanism defined
in Section 3.1: given the probabilities (p1, p2, p3), the edge between agents (i, j) has weight
(pi + pj)/2.
The triangle on the right of Figure A shows this mapping: a point on the probability sim-
plex is mapped to a point of the same color on the simplex of topologies. Notice that according
to the matching rule above, in the extreme cases where the probability for one agent is 1
and the others’ are zero (any of the three vertices of the probability simplex) the correspond-
ing graph is a weighted star, where the agent with pi = 1 is the core. All the other points
in the simplex correspond to weighted complete graph. So the topology simplex has vertices
(0.5, 0.5, 0), (0, 0.5, 0.5), (0.5, 0, 0.5).
Let us start from the example in Figure 3. For the same case, figure B shows the projections
of the set of equilibria on the planes of the utility of two agents respectively, and makes the
diffeomorphism more evident. Agent 3 has the highest initial endowment, and ends up having
the highest level of utility in all the possible cases, ranging from 3.315 in its minimum, when
the network is a star in which agent 2 is the core (blue vertex), to 3.330 in its maximum (when
agent 3 is the core of the star). From this we can infer that the trade with agent 1 is the most
advantageous for agent 3, as well as for agent 2, as also her utility hits the minimum point when
she cannot trade with 3, and then increases when they trade on networks in which most of the
interactions are between 2 and 3 (there is higher weight on this edge, as represented in the blue
area). Clearly there is an asymptote in the growth of agent 1 utility moving towards a star in
which agent 3 is the core (green area) and viceversa for agent 3 moving towards a star for which
1 is the core (red area). Looking at Figure B, utility of agent 1 is represented on the x axis, and
utility of agent 3 on z axis: the figure has a twist in correspondence of the green area, where
the utility of 1 stabilises around 2.430 and utility of 3 steeply increases till its maximum, while
in correspondence of the red area utility of 1 stabilises around 3.330 while utility of 1 reaches
its maximum.
In Figure C we start from a different point in the space of goods, keeping the same utility
functions. The initial allocations are such that x1,1 > x2,1 > x3,1 and x2,2 > x1,2 > x3,2 that is
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agent 1 and 2 have a lot of both goods and agent 3 is the poorest in both goods. As before each
agent maximises her utility gain when she is the core of a star. Agent 3 is the one who is worse
off by being a peripheral node when agent 1 or agent 2 are the core. This is not surprisingly as
she is the one with the worst initial allocation. Viceversa utilities for agents 2 and 3 hit their
minimum when agent 3 is in the core. By going towards the points in which the frequency of
trades is mainly between agents 1 and 2 (the networks represented by the edge between the red
and blue vertices in Figure A) their utility is close to the maximum, meaning that both rich
agents would prefer trading among themselves because they can extract more utility, instead of
trading with the poor agent only.
In Figure D it is possible to observe the shape of the equilibrium points in the space of commodity
one and commodity two respectively, holding the other commodity constant. As we would expect
this is also a curved simplex, with each agent getting the highest quantity of each commodity
(the vertices of the curved simplex) when they are the core of a star network.
We then consider the case of extreme inequality in which agent 1 starts with a lot of both goods
and agents 2 and 3 have a much inferior initial allocation, more precisely x1,1 > x3,1 > x2,1
and x1,2 > x2,2 = x3,2, results are represented in Figure E for the case of a Cobb-Douglas with
α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.5, and in Figure F for the case in which they all prefer good 2 than good
1, that is their utility functions are such that αi = 0.2 for i = 1, 2, 3. The first thing that
we can notice is that the space of equilibria looks relatively similar in both cases, so that the
initial allocation matters much more than the preferences, provided preferences are homogeneous
across agents. Given the disproportion in initial allocations utility of agent 1 is greater than
the two “poor” agents for all possible network topologies, while agent 2 and 3 maximize their
utility when they are the core of a weighted star, as expected. Nonetheless notice that both
agent 2 and 3 will prefer to be in the periphery of the star where agent 1 is the core than being
in the periphery of the star where any of the other “poor” agent is in the core, even if the richest
agent is maximizing her utility in this case. This is because both agents 2 and 3 prefer to have
a consistent number of trades with agent 1, that is they will always prefer to trade in networks
in which the weight of the edge connecting them with agent 1 is higher ceteris paribus, and this
determines the “boomerang” shape of the set of equlibria.
Now consider the case in which agent 1 is still the richest, but the initial allocation is much less
unequal than the previous two cases. The initial allocations in this case are x1,1 > x2,1 > x3,1
and x1,2 > x2,2 > x3,2, so agent 3 is the poorest. The results are represented in Figure G,
preferences are the same as before. We can see how the picture drastically changes: now agent
2 worst position is when she is a peripheral node of a star where agent 1 is the core, and the
higher the frequency of trade in which agent 1 is involved, the lower agent’s 2 utility. Agent 3,
the most disadvantaged, is worst off when she is in the periphery of a star with 2 in the core,
she would rather prefer agent 1 to be the core. In general her utility will decrease the higher
the weight on the edge between 2 and 1.
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Figure 1: Example of the difference between a Walrasian equilibrium and a fair equilibrium in the Edgeworth box
and in the space of utilities.
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Figure 2: Graphical intuition for Proposition 7, representing the projection for three agents of the space of
marginal utilities with respect to the initial allocation. The light-blue curve represents the Pareto optimal points
in W, the red region is the set WN of those points that can be reached with our trading mechanism. If we start
with the three distinct stars that have one of those three agents as centers, we will end up in distinct points of
W, and hence WN has the same dimension of W.
Figure 3: Mapping between simplex of topologies and the corresponding equilibria. Only the three vertices are
shown, map is according to colors
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Figure A: Probability simplex (left) and corresponding simplex of topologies (right). Red corresponds to p1 = 1,
blue to p2 = 1, green to p3 = 1. The magnitude of the component of green, blue and red for each point is
proportional to the magnitude of the corresponding probability.
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Figure B: Projection of equilibria in the space of utility on agents’ planes
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Figure C: Equilibria of the fair trading represented on the space of utilities for the case α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.5 (left)
and projection on two-agents’ planes.
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Figure D: Set of equilibria of a fair trading on the space of one commodity only
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Figure E: α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.5, extreme inequality: agent 1 is rich agents 2,3 are poor.
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Figure F: α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.2, extreme inequality: agent 1 is rich agents 2,3 are poor
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Figure G: α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.2 moderate inequality: agent 1 richer than agents 2 and 3.
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